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THE PENDULUM SWINGS:
COMMERCE CLAUSE AND TENTH
AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO PASPA
Thomas L. Skinner III*
The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act1 (“PASPA”) prohib-
its betting, gambling, or wagering on competitive games (“sports betting,”
“sports gambling,” or “sports wagering”) wherein professional or amateur ath-
letes participate or are intended to participate.2  Enacted in 1992, PASPA
makes it illegal for any government entity or person to participate in or sponsor
sports betting in all but a few states.  Exemptions were carved out for pari-
mutuel animal racing, jai-alai games, and for sports betting gambling schemes
already in existence or that would become authorized within one year from the
effective date of PASPA, provided that the municipality authorizing sports bet-
ting had continually operated a commercial casino gaming scheme throughout
the previous ten years.3
A handful of states, including Nevada, Montana, New Jersey, Delaware
and Oregon, benefited greatly from the carved out exemptions.  It is clear that
the Senate Judiciary Committee did not want to disrupt lawful sports gambling
schemes already operating when PASPA was introduced as Senate Bill 474.4
Nevada and Montana share one exemption wherein PASPA permitted states
that had conducted sports betting schemes at any time between January 1, 1976
and August 31, 1990 to continue them.5  Delaware and Oregon shared another
exemption that permitted any sports wagering operations legally conducted
between September 1, 1989 and October 2, 1991 to continue, which preserved
the sports lotteries operating in Oregon and Delaware.6  Finally, New Jersey
could have benefited from its own exemption that would have allowed it to
introduce sports betting within one year of PASPA’s effective date.7  However,
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Vegas.  I wish to acknowledge the brilliance I discovered in the writings of Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky and Professor Thomas B. Colby, upon whose works this Note largely relies.  I
am grateful to two fine mentors who inspired me over the years to reach for success in
business and life, Jim Higgins and Dave McGinn.  I also wish to thank Kevin A. Sprenz,
Esq. for encouraging me to pursue law.  Finally, and most importantly, I wish to thank my
wife, Lisa, and my children, Matthew and Julie, for their endless support and for their
inspiring hope in a bright future to come “when Daddy’s a lawyer.”
1 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704 (2006).
2 Id. § 3702(2).
3 Id. § 3704(a)(3)-(4).
4 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 8 (1992),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3559.
5 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(1).
6 Id. § 3704(a)(2).
7 Id. § 3704(a)(3).
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New Jersey missed the one-year window for legalizing sports betting under
PASPA, so today only Nevada enjoys the benefit of offering comprehensive
sports betting.  The other states benefit from limited sports betting or sports
gambling in the form of lotteries.8
In the wake of the economic downturn of the last few years,9 states have
sought to expand gambling to include sports betting as a potential source of
new revenue to offset budget shortfalls.10  If states were to tap into the sports
betting market, the economic benefit could be significant.  While approxi-
mately $2.5 billion is wagered legally in Nevada annually on sports,11 that fig-
ure represents a mere sliver of the proverbial pie.  The National Gaming Impact
Study Commission found that the total amount wagered on sports annually by
Americans was likely between $80 billion and $380 billion.12  Clearly, from
the perspective of a budget deficit-plagued state, this figure represents a poten-
tial revenue cash cow, if only it could be tapped.
Of course, the additional revenue to be gained by the licensing and taxing
of sports betting is virtually unobtainable by all states except Nevada, since
PASPA outlaws sports betting.  As a result, some states have begun to chal-
lenge the federal law in the courts as an unconstitutional exercise of Congres-
sional power in an effort to invalidate the law.13  While states have based their
legal challenges on several theories,14 the most appropriate legal challenge cen-
8 By way of example, see Nat’l Football League v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372,
1376 (D. Del. 1977) (containing a description of the Delaware sports lottery).  Oregon elimi-
nated its sports lottery, called “Sports Action,” in 2005 (effective following the 2006-2007
NFL season) in order to become eligible to host post-season NCAA college basketball tour-
nament games; see John Hunt, Betting on March Madness payoff, THE OREGONIAN, Feb. 25,
2009, http://www.oregonlive.com/collegebasketball/index.ssf/2009/02/betting_on_march_
madness_payof.html; see also David D. Waddel & Douglas L. Minke, Why Doesn’t Every
Casino Have a Sports Book?, GLOBAL GAMING BUSINESS, July 2008, at 34, 35 (containing a
brief description of sports wagering in each exempted state).
9 Anthony Karydakis, How long will the recession last?, CNNMONEY.COM, http://money.
cnn.com/2008/12/03/news/economy/karydakis.recession.fortune/index.htm (last updated
Dec. 3, 2008, 12:59 PM) (the recession of 2008 to be the longest since the Great Depres-
sion); Steve Matthews, Longest U.S. Slump Since ‘30s Ended in June ‘09, Group Says,
BLOOMBERG (Sep. 20, 2010, 2:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-20/u-s-
recession-ended-in-june-2009-was-longest-since-wwii-nber-panel-says.html (from the fourth
quarter of 2007 until the second quarter of 2009, the U.S. economy was in its “biggest slump
since the 1930s”).
10 Diane M. Grassi, States rush to legalize sports betting & expand gambling for revenue,
RENEWAMERICA (Mar. 13, 2010), http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/grassi/100313.
11 Sports Wagering, http://www.americangaming.org/industry-resources/research/fact-
sheets/sports-wagering (last visited Oct. 29, 2011); see also ROBERT M. JARVIS ET AL., GAM-
ING CASES AND MATERIALS, 279 (2003).
12 Nat’l Gambling Impact Study Comm’n, Final Report 2-14 (1999) available at http://gov
info.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/2.pdf.
13 Michael Beller, Sports betting law faces unconstitutionality claim, MEDILL WASHINGTON
(June 9, 2010), http://medilldev.net/2010/06/sports-betting-law-faces-unconstitutionality-
claim/?.
14 See, e.g., Complaint and Demand for Declaratory Relief at 18, 21, 23, 26-27, 29, 31, 33,
35, Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n, Inc. v. Holder, 2011 WL 802106 (D.N.J.
2011) (No. 09-1301) (plaintiff alleged that PASPA should be found unconstitutional under
several theories relating to: (1) Commerce Clause, (2) Equal Protection, (3) vagueness and
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ters around Congress’s use of its Commerce Clause authority and whether that
use constitutes an infringement of states’ rights under the Tenth Amendment.
This Note will address the strength of the Commerce Clause argument
(from a historical perspective) as the basis for challenging PASPA and whether
opponents are likely to succeed under this theory in the courts.  Part I will
discuss the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence through relevant case
law history.  In the twentieth century, the power to regulate under the Com-
merce Clause became one of the greatest and broadest sources of power ever
assumed by Congress.  However, Congress has not always maintained such
broad authority under the Commerce Clause, as evidenced by cases from the
previous century dating back to the framing of the Constitution.  Furthermore,
although the power to regulate under this constitutional provision is admittedly
vast, the Supreme Court tempered the once seemingly unbridled authority in
recent years.
Part II will discuss the relevant case law history of states’ rights under the
Tenth Amendment.  Once esteemed as a protection against tyranny and a bea-
con representing the founding principle of government by the people, the Tenth
Amendment has largely lost any real weight as a check on federal power.  In
fact, at times it seemed to have been figuratively put to death by the Supreme
Court.  The critical lever that determines the weight of the Tenth Amendment
as a check on federal power lies in its construction.  The Court has seemingly
oscillated between two interpretations of the effect of the Tenth Amendment on
Congressional power, which depending on the construction chosen may be out-
come determinative with regard to the constitutionality of PASPA.
Part III will evaluate the potential outcomes and likely result of PASPA
litigation based on a Commerce Clause or Tenth Amendment challenge before
the Supreme Court.  Although the subject matter of PASPA falls within the
bounds of interstate commerce power, this section will discuss reasons why the
constitutional challenges to PASPA should prevail.  Most notably, PASPA vio-
lates the original meaning of the uniformity requirement of the Commerce
Clause; it reaches too far into the zone of authority reserved to the states, as
sovereigns, to regulate their citizens under the Tenth Amendment.
I. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
CONGRESS’S GREATEST POWER
With just sixteen simple words, the drafters of the Constitution of the
United States granted Congress its greatest power: “[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
tribes.”15  The power to regulate “among the several States” is known today as
the “interstate commerce”16 power and is the source of power Congress uses to
regulate domestic affairs of commerce.  This is arguably the most important
overbreadth, (4) Tenth Amendment, (5) Eleventh Amendment, (6) First Amendment, (7)
procedural Due Process, (8) substantive Due Process, and (9) privacy).
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16 Fargo v. Stevens, 121 U.S. 230, 239 (1887) (“. . .what has come to be known as interstate
commerce. . .and which is called in the constitution of the United States ‘commerce among
the states’. . .”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-2\NVG207.txt unknown Seq: 4 10-JAN-12 16:03
314 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:311
enumerated power granted to Congress by the Constitution,17 and it has been
the subject of the majority of Supreme Court cases dealing with the scope of
congressional power and federalism.18
A. Gibbons v. Ogden and Commerce as Intercourse
The starting point19 for Commerce Clause analysis begins with the 1824
case of Gibbons v. Ogden.20  In Gibbons, the Court considered whether a
license given by the United States Congress to Thomas Gibbons to operate a
steamboat service in the waters between New Jersey and New York violated
the exclusive right granted by the Legislature of the State of New York to
Aaron Ogden to operate a ferry boat in the same waters.21  The Court held that
the federal grant preempted the monopoly granted by New York state law, and
that the New York law, furthermore, was an impermissible restriction on inter-
state commerce.22  With this decision, the Court articulated that “commerce”
was not limited “to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of com-
modities” alone.23  Rather, “commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic but it is some-
thing more: it is intercourse.  It describes the commercial intercourse between
nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing
rules for carrying on that intercourse.”24  And with that statement, the Court
defined the scope of the commerce power as essentially encompassing all
phases of business.25
Additionally, the Gibbons Court clarified the phrase “among the several
States” by construing it to mean commerce that was “intermingled with” the
states.26  “A thing which is among others, is intermingled with them.  Com-
merce among the states, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state,
but may be introduced into the interior.”27  But the Court was careful to make
clear that the word “among” should be restricted to apply to commerce activity
between two or more states, while the power to regulate commerce carried out
wholly within a state was reserved to that state itself.28  Ultimately, the Court
declared that, within these boundaries, the Constitution granted Congress ple-
nary power to regulate and prescribe rules for governing commerce among the
states (interstate commerce) but not commerce within the states (intrastate
commerce).29
17 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 242 (3d ed.
2006).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 243.
20 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
21 More specifically, New York granted the exclusive right to navigate all waters within its
jurisdiction to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton who subsequently granted a license to
Aaron Ogden. See id. at 1-2.
22 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 244.
23 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189.
24 Id. at 189-90 (emphasis added).
25 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 244.
26 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 244.
27 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.
28 Id. at 194-95.
29 Id. at 195-96.
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B. Intrastate Commerce
For the next half century, the Court rarely had occasion to revisit the scope
of the commerce power bestowed on Congress, apart from a handful of post-
Civil War cases.30  But in 1871, the Court further extended the somewhat broad
scope of the commerce power defined under Gibbons by affirming Congress’s
authority to license ships that operated entirely intrastate.31  In The Daniel Ball,
the Court held such regulation was permitted so long as the merchandise being
transported originated in another state or ultimately ended up in another state.32
The Court reasoned that unsafe ships in intrastate commerce could adversely
affect ships in interstate commerce.33  Thus, the commerce power was
extended to reach even intrastate activity.
However, contemporaneously with The Daniel Ball, the Court also invali-
dated federal laws enacted under the commerce power for intruding too far into
intrastate trade.  For instance, the Court first held a federal law to be outside the
scope of Congress’s commerce power in United States v. Dewitt,34 in which the
Court invalidated a federal law regulating the sale of petroleum oils that could
catch fire at temperatures below 110 degrees.35  The Court concluded that the
law touched on “a police regulation, relating exclusively to the internal trade of
the state” and was thus not a valid application of federal commerce power.36
Therefore, while the commerce power was originally established as somewhat
broad in scope per Gibbons, it was clear that the Court limited the scope of the
power by characterizing the Commerce Clause as “a virtual denial of any
power to interfere with the internal trade and business of the separate states.”37
Wholly intrastate activity was off limits to Congress.
C. Dual Federalism and Zones of Authority
Over the next several decades, and following the enactment of The Inter-
state Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Congress
began a period of heightened federal economic regulation based on Commerce
Clause authority.38  The Court, by this time controlled by laissez-faire conserv-
atives who were opposed in principle to economic regulations, invalidated
many laws for exceeding the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause author-
ity.39  In what some commentators might refer to as an “activist” approach, the
Court based its Commerce Clause jurisprudence during this period in what is
now termed “dual federalism”: federal and state governments, as separate sov-
ereigns, have separate zones of authority; the courts are left to protect those
powers reserved to the states by interpreting the Commerce Clause narrowly
30 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 246.
31 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 565 (1870).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 564; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 246.
34 United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869).
35 Id. at 45.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
38 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 247.
39 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-2\NVG207.txt unknown Seq: 6 10-JAN-12 16:03
316 UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:311
and enforcing the Constitution against the federal government whenever it
exceeds the boundaries of its federal zone of authority.40
The dual federalism era resulted in the development of three doctrines that
governed the enforcement of narrow constitutional limits on Congress’s com-
merce power.41  First, the Court defined “commerce” narrowly in order to leave
a clear zone of power to the states.42  Second, the Court maintained that
“among the states” meant that Congress could only regulate if a substantial
effect on interstate commerce existed.43  Third, the Tenth Amendment reserved
a zone of authority specifically to the states that Congress could not invade
regardless of whether the regulated activities involved interstate commerce.44
These three doctrines proved fatal to any federal legislation during the period
that hinted at encroaching on the zone carved out for states, particularly when
the legislation targeted economic activity.45
However, the Court did relax its application of these doctrines when deal-
ing with federal morals legislation,46 including gambling laws.  For example,
as early as 1903 the Court affirmed Congress’s authority to regulate activities it
considered immoral, including gambling.  In Champion v. Ames47 the Court
upheld a federal law that made it illegal to transport lottery tickets from one
state to another.48  The Court compared Congress’s prerogative to regulate lot-
teries with that of the states’ power to regulate the same within their borders,
and concluded:
If a state, when considering legislation for the suppression of lotteries within its own
limits, may properly take into view the evils that inhere in the raising of money, in
that mode, why may not Congress, invested with power to regulate commerce among
the several states, provide that such commerce shall not be polluted by the carrying
of lottery tickets from one state to another?49
Thus, whereas states could regulate morals within their jurisdictions, Con-
gress could regulate the same “evils” to prevent them from becoming part of
interstate commerce, even if the immoral activities themselves were purely per-
formed intrastate.50
40 Id. at 248.
41 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 248.  For a compelling analysis supporting why the
Progressive Era Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause was consis-
tent with the original meaning of “commerce” and “among the states,” see Professor Randy
E. Barnett’s discussion of the constitutional text compared to contemporaneous dictionaries,
Constitutional Convention speeches, the Federalist Papers, and other historical documents.
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101
(2001).




46 Id. (emphasis added).
47 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
48 Id. at 363.
49 Id. at 356.
50 But note that while the Champion Court rooted much of its decision in morals-based
reasoning, it actually framed the issue in the case as whether there was any “solid founda-
tion” whereby Congress could “regulate the carrying of lottery tickets from one State to
another.” Id. at 353 (emphasis added).  It concluded and repeated time and again that Con-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVG\2-2\NVG207.txt unknown Seq: 7 10-JAN-12 16:03
Fall 2011] THE PENDULUM SWINGS 317
Compare Champion with Hammer v. Dagenhart.51  In Hammer, the Court
held unconstitutional a federal law prohibiting the shipment of goods manufac-
tured by companies that employed child labor.52  The law only regulated the
transfer of goods in interstate commerce.  However, the Court invalidated the
law because it ostensibly controlled production of the goods, an activity that
occurred entirely intrastate.53 Hammer and Champion, are therefore similar in
that they both represent Congress’s attempt to regulate the interstate movement
of items otherwise produced and regulated purely intrastate.  The only real dif-
ference between these decisions is that the Court viewed gambling activity in
Champion as a moral evil and thus upheld the law, even though the law in
Champion, like the law in Hammer, essentially regulated intrastate activity tra-
ditionally reserved to the states.
D. Cumulative Effect and the Great Expansion of the Commerce Power
By the 1930’s, the Great Depression had left the country crippled.  Eco-
nomic conditions, political sentiment, and the intellectual frailty underlying
some of the Court’s decisions, combined taken together, operated to pressure
the Court into a shift in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence.54  The country was
crippled by the devastation of the Great Depression.  Many of the decisions
handed down by the Court seemed to be supported by arbitrary distinctions
(e.g., the Champion decision compared to Hammer), and political pressure for
change climaxed when President Roosevelt introduced legislation to increase
the size of the Supreme Court to fifteen Justices.55
The Court’s sentiment subsequently shifted in favor of Congress’s eco-
nomic regulations and opened the door for the commerce power to ascend to
new levels.56  Beginning in 1937 with N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,57 the Court began an unprecedented run in favor of expanding the com-
gress had the power to regulate lottery tickets, but only as “subjects of traffic.” Id.  It further
explained that states had the power to legislate the suppression (or not) of lotteries within
their borders, while Congress could regulate only the trafficking of lottery tickets in inter-
state commerce. Id. at 357.  The Court emphasized that the federal legislation in question did
“not assume to interfere with traffic or commerce in lottery tickets carried on exclusively
within the limits of any State. . .It has not assumed to interfere with the completely internal
affairs of any State.” Id.  That Court recognized in no uncertain terms that the power to
regulate lotteries directly fell within the police power reserved to the states. Id. at 364-65.
51 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
52 Id. at 276.
53 Id. at 273-74 (the Court concluded that the Constitution gave Congress power over inter-
state commerce “to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to
control the States in their exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture”).
54 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 254-55.
55 Id. at 255-56; see also BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPIN-
ION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 195-96, 232 (2009); for more on the “court packing” ploy, see ROBERT JACKSON, THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 197-235
(1941).
56 Justice Owen Roberts’ shift in position, making him the fifth vote in two watershed cases
dealing with laws of the type that had previously been struck down by the Court is com-
monly referred to as “the switch in time that saved nine.” See generally, JACKSON, supra
note 55, at 197-235; FRIEDMAN, supra note 55, at 195-96, 225-36.
57 N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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merce power that lasted nearly sixty years.  A triad of cases in which the Court
overruled previous decisions essentially recast Congress’s commerce power as
broadly expansive in scope.  First, in N.L.R.B. the Court upheld the National
Labor Relations Act, which gave employees the right to collective bargaining,
prohibited discrimination against union members, and created the National
Labor Relations Board to enforce the law.58  The Court reasoned that because
labor relations affected commerce (per Congress’s extensive and detailed find-
ings) it could be regulated.59
Second, in 1941 the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 in
United States v. Darby.60  The law made it unlawful to ship in interstate com-
merce anything made by employees who were not paid the federal minimum
wage.  The Court rejected its previous notion that manufacturing was not part
of commerce.61  Instead, it redefined commerce to include production, explain-
ing that “[w]hile manufacture is not of itself interstate commerce, the shipment
of manufactured goods interstate is such commerce and the prohibition of such
shipment by Congress is indubitably a regulation of commerce” under the ple-
nary power granted to it by the Constitution.62
The Court rounded out the opening of a new era of expansive commerce
power jurisprudence with the final case in the trio: Wickard v. Filburn.63  With
its Filburn decision, the Court made clear that it had completely rejected its
pre-1937 Commerce Clause doctrines.64  Upholding the enforcement of a
wheat production quota against a small dairy farmer under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, the Court rejected fact-based distinctions it previously used to
determine the scope of Congress’s power, including distinctions between com-
merce and production, or indirect and direct impact on interstate commerce.65
Instead, the Court would not invalidate a law simply because the farmer’s
effect on interstate commerce was insignificant or trivial in and of itself; rather,
the Court declared that where his “contribution to the demand for wheat may be
trivial by itself, [it] is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal
regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many
others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”66  Therefore, the Court deter-
mined, even small acts of personal activities, such as growing wheat for home
consumption, were within the reaches of federal legislation if those individual
activities, when combined with others, could create a nontrivial cumulative
effect on interstate commerce.67
58 Id. at 49; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 256.
59 See N.L.R.B, 301 U.S. at 31 (the law defined “affecting commerce” as being “in com-
merce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or
tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce”).
60 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941).
61 Compare with Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941).
62 Darby, 312 U.S. at 113.
63 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
64 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 258.
65 Id.
66 Filburn, 317 U.S. at 127-28.
67 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 259.
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Essentially, the new rule or test was that Congress could regulate anything
using the commerce power as long as the activity, when taken cumulatively
across the country, provided some minimal degree of rational basis for the
Court to find a substantial effect on interstate commerce.68  Thus, the Court
initiated an era in which it affirmed Congress’s ever-broadening and expansive
commerce power.  As a result, between 1937 and 1995 the Court did not hold a
single federal law to have exceeded the constitutional scope of Congress’s
commerce power.69
E. Gibbons Redux: A Return to Limits on the Commerce Power
The corpus juris remained unchanged until 1995 when the Court again
shifted course and pulled back on Congress’s seemingly open-ended preroga-
tive to legislate using the commerce power.  In United States v. Lopez70 the
Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.71  In that case, the
federal law prohibited possessing a gun within one thousand feet of a school.72
The Court held the law was not substantially related to interstate commerce.73
In so doing, and after surveying the history of decisions interpreting the Com-
merce Clause, the Court clarified three categories of interstate commerce activ-
ity that may be regulated under the commerce power.  Congress may: (1)
“regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce,”74 such as hotels and
restaurants along the public highways, (2) “regulate and protect the instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce,”75 including persons and things of commerce
like railroads, and (3) “regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce.”76  The Court had laid out a framework for curbing the
ever-expanding commerce power wielded by Congress.
Then, in United States v. Morrison,77 the Court affirmed the new three-
part test specified in Lopez for analyzing the limits of Congress’s commerce
68 Id.; see Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-34 (1981) (“A court may invalidate legisla-
tion enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a
congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is
no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends.”
(emphasis added)).
69 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 259.
70 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
71 Id. at 567.
72 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2006); Id. § 921(a)(25).
73 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
74 Id. at 558 (emphasis added); see also Pierce Cnty., Wash. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 146-
47 (2003) (The Court upheld federal statutes that made traffic studies by local governments
not discoverable if they were done as part of an application for federal funding.  Justice
Thomas explained that “[i]t is well established that the Commerce Clause gives Congress
authority to regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. . .[The federal statutes]
can be viewed as legislation aimed at improving safety in the channels of interstate com-
merce.  As such, they fall within Congress’ Commerce Clause power” (emphasis added));
see also Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullability: Piercing the Surface of Commerce
Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1498 (2004).
75 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 558-59 (emphasis added).
77 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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power, but Morrison narrowed the commerce power even more.78  The case
centered on whether the civil damages provision of the federal Violence
Against Women Act was constitutional.79  The law permitted victims of gender
violence to sue for money damages and was supported by detailed legislative
findings that state protections for women victims of domestic violence and sex-
ual crimes were inadequate.80  The Court rejected the law, because it dealt with
an area of noneconomic activity traditionally governed by the states.  Specifi-
cally, the Court said:
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity.  While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects
of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation’s
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only
where that activity is economic in nature.81
Thus, the Court rejected Congress’s findings that ostensibly confirmed a
link between domestic violence and its impact on interstate commerce.
Applicable to the gambling analysis here, the Court declared “the exis-
tence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the consti-
tutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.  As we stated in Lopez, ‘[S]imply
because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects
interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.’”82  The Court limited the
commerce power by declaring that Congress could not regulate noneconomic
activities, even when Congress’s findings indicated that the cumulative effect
of the noneconomic activities substantially affected commerce.
To be clear, the Court affirmed in Gonzales v. Raich83 that economic
activity includes the intrastate production of goods sold in interstate commerce,
so cumulative impact can be used to determine substantial effect when activity
is economic in nature.84  In Raich, the Court held it was constitutional for Con-
gress to use the commerce power to prohibit the cultivation and possession of
medicinal marijuana, even though California had created an exemption for
medical use in its marijuana laws.85
Therefore, at least for now, it appears settled that Congress may regulate
within constitutional bounds using the commerce power whenever one of the
three areas outlined in Lopez are the subject of the legislation: channels of
interstate commerce, instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or economic
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  Thus, consis-
tent with Gibbons, the Lopez Court affirmed the plenary nature of Congress’s
authority to legislate matters of interstate commerce,86 but only when such mat-
ters are actually within the constitutional bounds of interstate commerce.
78 Id. at 608-09.
79 Id. at 601.
80 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 267.
81 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
82 Id. at 614 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995)).
83 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
84 Id. at 17-20.
85 Id. at 9; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 271.
86 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
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II. THE TENTH AMENDMENT
The Tenth Amendment provides that all “powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”87  The meaning of this
amendment has been the topic of much debate.88  Generally, the question is
whether or not the Tenth Amendment should be considered to be a judicially
enforceable restraint on congressional power.  The answer lies in the construc-
tion of the amendment, and the significance to this Note is that the amend-
ment’s affect on PASPA challenges may turn on which interpretation the Court
applies.
One view is that the Tenth Amendment is not a separate constraint on
congressional power.89  Instead, it is merely a truism reflecting the fact that
Congress only has power to legislate when given authority by the Constitu-
tion.90  Under this approach, the Court cannot hold a federal law to be unconsti-
tutional as a violation of the Tenth Amendment, but rather can only strike a
federal law for violating other provisions of the Constitution.91
The competing view is that the Tenth Amendment is, in fact, a restraint on
Congress that protects sovereign states from federal intrusion.92  This approach
would draw the boundaries of federalism boldly and vigorously and defend
from federal encroachment the zone of activity reserved exclusively to the
states.  Under this approach, the Court may hold a federal law to be unconstitu-
tional as a Tenth Amendment violation whenever Congress intrudes into the
reserved zone of activity.93  The values most often cited as reasons for advanc-
ing the federalism of this approach are: (1) preventing federal tyranny, (2)
enhancing democracy by safeguarding government that is closer to the people,
and (3) allowing states to serve as laboratories for new ideas.94  Regardless of
the values cited by proponents of either view, the dispute over the competing
interpretations of the Tenth Amendment is ultimately a policy debate about the
importance of protecting state sovereignty via federalism and whether the judi-
ciary or the political process is best suited to take on the role of protecting state
prerogatives.95
Not surprisingly, the Court’s view on federalism and the construction of
the Tenth Amendment has closely paralleled its Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence.  In fact, the commerce power and the Tenth Amendment protection of
87 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
88 See generally, DAVID SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); Lynn A. Baker, The
Revival of States’ Rights: A Progress Report and a Proposal, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
95 (1998); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763
(2006); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neuro-
sis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994); Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’s Theory of Interac-
tive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133 (2006); Norman R. Williams, The Commerce
Clause and the Myth of Dual Federalism, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1847 (2007).
89 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 313.
90 See infra note 105, at 124.
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states’ rights are simply two sides of the same coin.  On one side, the Com-
merce Clause gives authority to Congress.  Once that authority is duly estab-
lished under the Constitution, Congress may act.  However, on the other side,
the Tenth Amendment restricts that authority if it intrudes upon states’ rights.
A. Plenary Power
In the nineteenth century, the Court followed the first approach by uphold-
ing federal laws as constitutional so long as Congress acted within the scope of
its enumerated authority.96  According to the Gibbons Court, Congress’s com-
merce power was “complete in itself” without limitations save those prescribed
in the Constitution.97  Chief Justice Marshall explained that while the Constitu-
tion grants authority to Congress over limited objects, the power granted “is
plenary as to those objects” and the commerce power “is vested in Congress as
absolutely as it would be in a single government.”98  The commerce power was
not to be limited in any way by state sovereignty, but rather only by the people
through the political process.99  Judicially enforced limits to protect the states
found no place in Gibbons.100
B. State Authority Preserved
However, in the early twentieth century and until 1937, the Court shifted
to the second approach.  During this period, the Court held in Hammer v.
Dagenhart that the Tenth Amendment reserved control over production to the
states.101  In finding that the regulation of production of goods was off limits to
federal regulation, the Court explained that the purpose of the Commerce
Clause was to give Congress power to regulate interstate commerce and “not to
give it authority to control the states in their exercise of the police power over
local trade and manufacture.”102  The Hammer Court indicated that regulation
of hours worked by children was a matter of “purely state authority.”103  Fed-
eral laws that intruded on this zone of authority were unconstitutional viola-
tions of the Tenth Amendment.104  So, while the commerce power may have
been broad, it had its limits, and the courts could curtail the power if it
encroached upon traditional state authority.
C. Decline of the Tenth Amendment Check on Federal Power
From 1937 to the 1990’s, the Court reverted back somewhat to the first
approach – that the Tenth Amendment was not a separate constraint on Con-
gress’s commerce power.  In United States v. Darby105 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 which made it unlaw-
96 Id.
97 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
98 Id. at 197.
99 Id.
100 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 246.
101 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 269, 271-72 (1918).
102 Id. at 273-74.
103 Id. at 276.
104 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 313.
105 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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ful to ship goods in interstate commerce that were produced by employees paid
less than the prescribed minimum wage.106  With its decision, the Court
expressly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart and rejected its prior holding that
control of production of goods put into interstate commerce was reserved to the
states.  In Darby, the Court at once extended commerce authority to include
production and practically extinguished any strength previously retained by the
Tenth Amendment for limiting federal power.107
In fact, during this period the Court cited only one Tenth Amendment
violation, and even that decision was eventually expressly overruled.108  That
case was National League of Cities v. Usery,109 in which the Court considered
a challenge to the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The law
extended minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all employ-
ees of states and their political subdivisions.  The Court held the law violated
the Tenth Amendment by “operat[ing] to directly displace the States’ freedom
to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions”110 because it forced states to “substantially restructure traditional ways
in which [they] have arranged their affairs.”111  The problem with the outcome
of the case was that the Court indicated an unconstitutional encroachment into
state affairs, but did not define what would be considered a “traditional govern-
mental function.”112
Consequently, nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,113 after distinguishing several cases from Usery, the Court
finally expressly overruled it as “unsound in principle and unworkable in prac-
tice.”114  In holding that the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to the states, the
Court reasoned that leaving it to the courts to make policy decisions about
“traditional” government functions “invites an unelected federal judiciary to
make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dis-
likes.”115  The Court then acknowledged the “special and specific position” that
states occupy within the constitutional system that should be reflected by limits
on Congress’s commerce power, but instructed that those limits should be
imposed by the political process.116  Therefore, as a result of the Court’s sug-
gestion, the Tenth Amendment as a check on federal power was virtually
dead.117
106 Id. at 117, 121.
107 Id. at 124 (“The Amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered.”).
108 See generally Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
109 Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 835-37.
110 Id. at 852 (emphasis added).
111 Id. at 849.
112 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 319.
113 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
114 Id. at 546-47.
115 Id. at 546.
116 Id. at 556 (“The political process ensures that the laws that unduly burden the States will
not be promulgated.”).
117 But see Justice Rehnquist’s lament and prediction that the Tenth Amendment protection
of states’ rights would rise again. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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D. Federalism Reborn
Nevertheless, in the 1990’s the Court again appeared to breathe new life
into the Tenth Amendment as a constitutional limitation on congressional
power.118  Within a decade, the Court resurrected the Tenth Amendment’s limi-
tation on federal commerce power in what Professor Chemerinsky describes as
a “new federalism.”119
First, in New York v. United States120 the Court invalidated the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act as a violation of the Tenth Amend-
ment.121  In that case, the federal law imposed a duty on states to dispose of
radioactive waste and required states to “take title” to all waste generated
within their borders or else be liable for damages claims due to the waste.122
The Court noted that Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate radioactive waste disposal, but held that Congress violated the Tenth
Amendment by imposing the “take title” provision upon the states, because that
provision crossed the line from incentive to coercion by commandeering the
“legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program.”123  Thus, Congress may not force “state
legislatures to adopt laws or state agencies to adopt regulations.”124  Further-
more, “allowing Congress to commandeer state governments would undermine
government accountability because Congress could make a decision, but the
states would take the political heat and be held responsible for a decision that
was not theirs.”125
Five years after New York, the Court decided Printz v. United States126
holding that the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act also violated the
Tenth Amendment.127  Among other things, the Brady Act required local law
enforcement officers to perform background checks on prospective handgun
purchasers (on an interim basis until a federal program was put in place).128
Echoing New York, the Court invalidated the portion of the federal law requir-
ing states to perform background checks, because it allowed Congress to imper-
missibly commandeer state officials to implement a federal mandate.129
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia said:
The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address
particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political sub-
divisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.  It matters not
whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or
118 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 322.
119 Id. at 326.
120 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
121 Id. at 177.
122 Id. at 174-75.
123 Id. at 176.
124 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 324.
125 Id.
126 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
127 Id. at 935.
128 Id. at 902-03.
129 Id.
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benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our con-
stitutional system of dual sovereignty.130
Finally, in Reno v. Condon,131 the Court rounded out recent “new federal-
ism” jurisprudence by rejecting a Tenth Amendment challenge – signaling a
key boundary to challenges of the kind – and upholding the federal law in
question.132  South Carolina had challenged the Driver’s Privacy Protection
Act, which restricted the ability of states to disclose personal information with-
out the driver’s consent.133  The Court held that the law was a valid reflection
of Congress’s commerce power because the sale and release of personal infor-
mation was an article in the interstate stream of commerce.134  Furthermore, it
held that the law did not attempt to regulate the states in their sovereign capac-
ity to regulate citizens, but rather it regulated states as the owners of
databases.135  In addition, the Court reasoned that the law did not require states
to enact any laws or regulations or require state officials to assist in the enforce-
ment of federal statutes governing citizens (as in Printz).136  Thus, the law was
upheld as a lawful exercise of congressional power that did not run afoul of the
Tenth Amendment.137
Ultimately, the Tenth Amendment’s bite appears to have teeth, however
small, once again.  The current stance of the Court is that Congress’s Com-
merce Clause power, while plenary in the area of interstate commerce, is lim-
ited to that realm.  Congress may not freely trample into the zone of authority
reserved to the states, beyond which areas of traditional government functions
are exercised by the states.  The Court is still likely to give a great deal of
deference to Congress, especially considering that many areas involving the
Tenth Amendment may better be resolved through the political process.  How-
ever, the Court will certainly intervene whenever federal law attempts to com-
mandeer state sovereignty or interferes with states in their sovereign capacity to
regulate citizens.
III. LIKELY OUTCOMES OF PASPA CHALLENGES
With the above illustration as a historical backdrop of Commerce Clause
and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, how is the Supreme Court likely to rule
on a constitutional challenge to PASPA?  As to the commerce power, the
answer is complicated and depends on the Court’s interpretation of the consti-
tutional scope of the Commerce Clause.  Here, the key questions are whether
Congress has reached beyond its constitutionally enumerated authority, and
whether uniformity is required by the Constitution.  If so, has Congress failed
to exercise the commerce power uniformly as required?  The Supreme Court’s
130 Id.
131 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
132 Id. at 147-48.
133 Id. at 144.
134 Id. at 148.
135 Id. at 151.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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ultimate decision on the constitutionality of PASPA will be informed by the
answers to questions such as these.
Despite arguments to the contrary, the Supreme Court will likely uphold
PASPA as a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  Such a
result is probable given the enormous expansion of the commerce power during
the last century, buoyed by the precedent of an errant line of dicta-based rea-
soning that underscores the misunderstood uniformity requirement of the com-
merce power.  Therefore, considering the general presumption of
constitutionality afforded legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause,138
coupled with the doctrine of stare decisis, relief, if any is to be found, will more
likely come as the result of a Tenth Amendment challenge.
The pendulum of federalism appears to be swinging again toward the pro-
tection of states’ rights.  Here, the essential questions are whether Congress
breached the boundaries of the zone of authority reserved to the states by enact-
ing PASPA, and whether the states, under PASPA, are simply being regulated
as participants in commerce or as sovereigns carrying on their traditional gov-
ernment functions.  As with the Commerce Clause challenge, the Court may be
inclined to reject a Tenth Amendment challenge, despite its plausible merits.
Nevertheless, if challengers of PASPA can persuasively articulate the
nuances of a few key constitutional arguments with respect to the Commerce
Clause and the Tenth Amendment, then there is a chance they may convince
the Court to strike down PASPA.  The following sections illuminate how those
nuances may best be understood and thus applied as challenges to PAPSA.
A. The Commerce Clause Challenge
The Constitution clearly enumerates and grants the commerce power to
Congress under Article I “to regulate commerce. . .among the several
states.”139  Under the modern test, a valid law regulating interstate commerce
must fall within one of the three areas the Lopez Court articulated as valid
exercises of the commerce power.140  PASPA appears to satisfy at least one
requirement of that test.  Specifically, the law regulates sports wagering, a bil-
lion dollar gambling industry, which is an economic activity having a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce.141  Gambling is big business and sports
wagering is a significant part of it.
Thus, notwithstanding the common sense observation that PASPA is fun-
damentally unfair in its differing treatment of the various state governments, it
appears to fall squarely within constitutionally enumerated Commerce Clause
authority.  As such, it will likely be difficult, if not impossible, for opponents of
PASPA to prevail under contemporary Commerce Clause analysis.  Fortu-
nately, however, the argument may not end there.  Surprisingly, the most prom-
ising direct attack on PASPA as an unconstitutional execution of the commerce
138 Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
139 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
140 See Part I.E, supra.
141 Nat’l Gambling Impact Study Comm’n, Final Report 2-14 (1999) available at http://gov
info.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/2.pdf.
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power may be rooted in the little known and misunderstood doctrine of the
uniformity requirement inherent in constitutional commerce power.
1. Failed Uniformity Arguments
Neither the plaintiffs in recent cases making their way through the Federal
courts, nor the original opponents of PASPA in Congress were able to articu-
late artfully the uniformity requirement of the Commerce Clause.  In fact, the
plaintiffs in one recent case failed to include a constitutional challenge in their
complaint altogether, so there was no occasion for them to argue for uniform-
ity.142  Apparently, that approach was a strategy by design, as they merely
wanted to urge expansion of the exemption carved out in PASPA for Delaware.
This strategy is a lost opportunity.  In contrast, plaintiffs in Interactive Media
Entertainment & Gaming Association, Inc. v. Holder143 (“IMEGA”) did allege
the unconstitutionality of PASPA as a Commerce Clause violation.  However,
the plaintiffs’ complaint merely claimed:
77. One of the purposes of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was to unify the
prevailing view among the States that Congress should be vested with the power to
regulate matters involving interstate commerce so long as this power was uniformly
applied throughout the United States.
78. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress is required to legislate uniformly
amongst the several states. . .
92. PASPA allows Nevada, Delaware, Oregon, and Montana to have a cartel on
Sports Betting in general in the United States to the detriment of the remaining 46
states.144
In a reply to defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the IMEGA plaintiffs
attempted to explain:
With regard to the regulation of gambling, the Tenth Amendment requires uniformity
between states. . .The United States Supreme Court has stated that occasionally there
is no requirement of national uniformity when Congress exercises its power under the
Commerce Clause to determine whether Federal regulation will apply. However,
such cases sustaining a lack of uniform treatment under the Tenth Amendment are
142 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Office of Com’r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293 (3d
Cir. 2009) (No. 09-914), cert. denied mem., 130 S.Ct. 2403 (2010) (presenting only two
questions on certiorari: “1. Whether the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(“PASPA”) prohibits Delaware from offering sports lotteries to generate revenues to help
alleviate its substantial budget deficits and satisfy its constitutional balanced-budget obliga-
tions.  2. Whether the panel below erred as a matter of law in deciding the merits in an
appeal of a denial of a preliminary injunction brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a),
where the factual record had not been developed and final adjudication of the merits turned
on contested factual considerations.”).
143 Complaint and Demand for Declaratory Relief, supra note 14, at 18.  Although this case
was dismissed for lack of standing, New Jersey Senator Raymond Lesniak, one of the plain-
tiffs, promised to bring the suit again after a referendum to legalize sports betting in the state
goes to voters in November 2011.  The Senator had previously convinced the state legisla-
ture to pass a bill legalizing the practice, but the bill was vetoed by the governor. See Mary-
Ann Spoto, Federal judge throws out lawsuit claiming N.J. sports betting ban is
unconstitutional, THE STAR-LEDGER, March 8, 2011, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/
2011/03/federal_judge_throws_out_lawsu.html.
144 Complaint and Demand for Declaratory Relief, supra note 14, at 18, 20.
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only held to apply when the subject matter of the litigation requires, or is only sus-
ceptible to, non-uniform treatment.145
Rather inartfully, the plaintiffs then attempted to distinguish their case
from Currin v. Wallace146 (upon which the defense relied), while analogizing it
to Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining Co.147 (which plaintiffs
believed supported their case).148
First, the IMEGA plaintiffs merely pointed out that unlike PASPA the
tobacco regulation at issue in Currin did not make tobacco markets illegal
while establishing interstate tobacco markets that disparately impacted certain
states.149  The plaintiffs attempted to draw the inference that since PASPA
makes sports betting illegal for some states but not others, then it is unconstitu-
tional.  Surprisingly, the plaintiffs failed to state even that plainly.  While the
IMEGA plaintiffs made a valid point, they made no additional argument to
explain why that point mattered, rendering it completely ineffective.
Second, the IMEGA plaintiffs alleged that the non-uniform nature of
PASPA was unlike the disparate regulations controlling the production and
refining of sugar in Central Roig, because the Court in that case only stated
there was no requirement for “geographic uniformity” under the Commerce
Clause.150  In Central Roig, the costs of sugar production in U.S. states were
different than in Puerto Rico, which gave rise to an exception of the uniform
regulation of the sugar trade.  The IMEGA plaintiffs claimed that, unlike the
case in Central Roig, there was no geographic purpose for PASPA to ignore the
uniformity requirement.151
Third, the IMEGA plaintiffs argued that since an anti-gambling advertising
statute was invalidated for “containing a variety of exemptions, some with
obscured congressional purposes,” PASPA likewise should be invalidated on
similar grounds.152  These arguments were feeble attempts to call into question
PASPA’s unfair discrimination against states due to non-uniformity; unfortu-
nately, they lacked a necessary foundation in constitutional support.
The congressional record on the bill that became PASPA, Senate Bill
474,153 reveals an even more disappointing attempt at challenging PASPA’s
discrimination against the states by calling for uniformity.  In fact, after includ-
ing several paragraphs on the states’ rights issue, the record includes only a few
sentences on the discrimination issue, merely amounting to an identification of
the matter without any substantive argument against it: “Perhaps even more
troubling, this legislation would blatantly discriminate between the States.
145 Brief of Plaintiffs Interactive Media Ent’mt & Gaming Ass’n, Inc. in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 28, Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n, Inc. v.
Holder, 2011 WL 802106 (2011) (No. 09-1301) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Interac-
tive Media Opposition].
146 Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); see infra notes 160, 211 and accompanying text.
147 Sec’y of Agric. v. Cent. Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604 (1950).
148 Interactive Media Opposition, supra note 145, at 29-30.
149 Id. at 29.
150 Cent. Roig, 338 U.S. at 616.
151 Interactive Media Opposition, supra note 145, at 29-30.
152 Id. at 31-32 (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173
(1999) (internal quotes omitted)).
153 S. 474, 102d Cong. (1992) (enacted).
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Under S. 474, Nevada, Oregon, and Delaware would be grandfathered.  Thus,
these three States would be granted a Federal monopoly on lawful sports
wagering to the exclusion of the other 47 States.”154  This was simply inade-
quate to challenge PASPA successfully.
If future challengers of PASPA expect to carry the Court, they must better
articulate the constitutional arguments that refute discrimination between the
states, including the constitutional foundation supporting the lost uniformity
requirement of the Commerce Clause.
2. Understanding the Lost Uniformity Requirement
The above allegations, while mostly legitimate, were little more than
empty arguments.  They lacked the substance required to prevail over the
Court’s seemingly settled, yet incomplete, Commerce Clause position.  It is
true that the modern Court has routinely indicated that the Constitution does not
require uniformity in the exercise of the commerce power over the states.155
Rather, the Court has stated, Congress is free to “regulate states unevenly”
under the commerce power.156  In fact, the Court has even gone so far as to
describe the notion that congressional action might be invalid for lack of uni-
formity as having “no warrant.”157  After all, the Court reasoned, the commerce
power is plenary, so Congress may use its discretion when wielding that
power.158
Found in the pages of the Court’s opinions, this trend buoyed proponents’
confidence in PASPA’s constitutionality, even though the law clearly discrimi-
nated against all but a few states.159  The law’s sponsor, Senator Bill Bradley,
rationalized that since the Supreme Court “explicitly held that there is no
requirement of uniformity when Congress is exercising its power pursuant to
the Commerce Clause,” then there was “no legitimate constitutional basis” for
contesting the law for discriminating among the states.160
Thus, by its plain language, PASPA carved out discriminatory exemptions
for specific states.161  Congress had “no wish to apply this new prohibition
retroactively to Oregon or Delaware, which instituted sports lotteries prior to
154 S. REP NO. 102-248, at 11 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3563 (Minority
Views of Senator Grassley).
155 Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uniformity Constraint on the Commerce
Power, 91 VA. L. REV. 249, 259 nn. 32-34 & 36 (2005).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 259.
159 Id.
160 Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act – Policy Concerns
Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 17-18 (1992).  Senator Bradley cited
to James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) and Currin v. Wallace,
306 U.S. 1 (1939), but his conclusion was based on an egregious constitutional error com-
mitted by the Court.  As discussed later in this Part III, James Clark Distilling did not, in
fact, explicitly hold that uniform treatment of the states was not a requirement of the Com-
merce Clause, and the Currin Court misunderstood James Clark Distilling and its previous
line of cases; see also Colby, supra note 155, at 260.
161 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(1)-(3) (2006).
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the introduction of [the federal] legislation,”162 nor did it wish to apply the
prohibition to Montana’s form of sports betting already existing in bingo par-
lors.163  And, of course, Congress had no “desire to threaten the economy of
Nevada, which over many decades has come to depend on legalized private
gambling, including sports gambling, as an essential industry.”164
Significantly, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National
Association of State Budget Officers, the North American Association of State
and Provincial Lotteries, and the Council of State Governments opposed
PASPA for, among other reasons, its unequal treatment of the states.165  Fur-
thermore, the Department of Justice, in a letter to Senator Biden, then Chair of
the Judiciary Committee, expressed its concerns about the constitutionality of
the proposed law.166
Despite concerns about its constitutionality, PASPA passed anyway.  But
did that mean the uniformity concern was unfounded?  Not in the least.  Profes-
sor Colby made a thorough and compelling argument supporting the Commerce
Clause’s uniformity requirement based on historical research of the Framers’
intent, historical documents, and political impetus for including the commerce
power in the Constitution.167  In his view, the “uniformity constraint on the
commerce power was of the utmost importance to the framing generation, and
it is highly unlikely that the Constitution would have been proposed or ratified
without it.”168  He asserts that the modern Court’s interpretation of commerce
power uniformity is flawed and should be returned to the proper construction
that provided for uniform application of the commerce power among the
states.169
The uniformity requirement of the commerce power was of fundamental
importance to the Framers.170  But based on a plain text reading of the section,
notes Professor Colby, the modern Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, but
has not explicitly held, that the Constitution does not require or constrain Con-
gress to legislate uniformly among the states under the Commerce Clause.171
Today’s Court is likely to reach the same conclusion, finding a “straightforward
textual reading” of the Constitution to support the constitutionality of PASPA,
because of the way in which the Commerce Clause contrasts with the Bank-
ruptcy Clause and the Tax Uniformity Clause.172  Both the Bankruptcy Clause
and the Tax Uniformity Clause explicitly require uniform regulation, while the
162 JUDICIARY COMM., S. REP NO. 102-248, at 8 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3553, 3559.
163 138 CONG. REC. 12,973 (daily ed. June 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
164 S. REP NO. 102-248, at 8.
165 Colby, supra note 155, at 256-57.
166 Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Sen. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, United States S. (Sept. 24, 1991) available at
http://federalgaminglaw.com/page18/files/PAPSAletters_DOJ_Senate91.pdf.
167 See generally Colby, supra note 155.
168 Id. at 311.
169 Id. at 255.
170 Id. at 253.
171 Id. at 252.
172 Id.
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Commerce Clause does not.173  So, unless opponents of PASPA can persuade
the Court to reconsider the underlying constitutional genesis of the Commerce
Clause, and its elusive uniformity requirement, the Court will likely reject a
commerce power challenge.
To that end, opponents of PASPA should appeal to the Court’s reverence
for historical tradition to urge it to drop the modern trend in favor of a rule
consistent with the Framers’ original intent and “the once-settled general under-
standing of the scope of the commerce power.”174  As Professor Colby
explains:
It would probably come as a surprise to Senator Bradley, and to many members of
the current Supreme Court, that Justice Story once declared quite matter-of-factly
that the Constitution “prevent[s] any possibility of applying the power to. . .regulate
commerce[ ] injuriously to the interests of any other state, so as to favour or aid
another.”  And the Justices might be even more shocked to learn that the Court itself
once decreed that, because “the want of uniformity in commercial regulations[ ] was
one of the grievances of the citizens under the Confederation[ ] and the new Constitu-
tion was adopted, among other things, to remedy th[at] defect[ ] in the prior system,”
the Constitution provides that “Congress. . .is forbidden to make any discrimination
in enacting commercial or revenue regulations.”175
Thus, there is historical evidence supporting the proposition that the Com-
merce Clause requires an element of uniformity, even without an express
phrase to that effect in the text of the Constitution.
Furthermore, much like the Court was able to find the principle of Equal
Protection of citizens inherent in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause,176 so too can the Court find a requirement for fundamentally fair, uni-
form treatment among the states inherent in the Commerce Clause.  Of course,
ordinary principles of statutory construction would reject such an interpretation,
instead requiring a plain text analysis.  Certainly, if the object of construction
were a statute, then where two clauses include a uniformity requirement while
another does not, the rules of construction would foreclose extension of the
uniformity provision to the latter.177  However, the object of interpretation is
not a statute.  As Chief Justice Marshall once said, “we must never forget that it
is a constitution we are expounding.”178
The Constitution was adopted, in part, to ensure the efficiency and nondis-
crimination of commercial regulations.179  Professor Colby describes the “effi-
173 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3-4.
174 Colby, supra note 155 at 262.
175 Id. at 262-63 (quoting from 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES § 1011 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Co. 1833) and Ward v. Maryland,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 431 (1870)).
176 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954).
177 The canon of construction implied here is expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a “canon
of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the
other, or of the alternative.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 494 (abr. 8th ed. 2005).
178 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis omitted).  Along
the same lines, Judge Learned Hand once mused, “There is no more likely way to misap-
prehend the meaning of language – be it in a constitution, a statute, a will or a contract –
than to read the words literally, forgetting the object which the document as a whole is meant
to secure.” Cent. Hanover B. & T. Co. v. C.I.R., 159 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
179 Colby, supra note 155 at 289.
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ciency” goal as requiring “uniform rules” and the “nondiscrimination” goal as
requiring “uniform treatment” of the states.180  He explains that while the
Framers were originally concerned with both “uniform rules” and “uniform
treatment” of the states,181 eventually the uniform rules requirement eroded
away.182  Thus, the erosion of the uniform rules requirement made it possible
for Congress to enact laws regulating interstate commerce that were flexible
enough to incorporate state law preferences, while still remaining uniform in
their treatment of all states.  In other words, the ultimate outcome or effect of
specific legislation may differ from one state to another, due to nuances at the
state level, but the federal law itself must still treat states uniformly.
A trio of cases both affirms the existence of a uniform treatment require-
ment for Commerce Clause power and explains how the requirement has come
to be forgotten.  In a dormant Commerce Clause case called Leisy v. Hardin,183
the Court explained that “interstate commerce, consisting in the transportation,
purchase, sale and exchange of commodities, is national in its character, and
must be governed by a uniform system.”184  That case dealt with the appropri-
ate role of state regulation regarding the sale of alcoholic beverages shipped in
interstate commerce.185  The Court noted that the power to regulate interstate
commerce rested exclusively with Congress, but Congress could exercise that
power “to permit the states to decide for themselves whether to prohibit the
importation of alcoholic beverages” into their borders.186
Consequently, Congress enacted the Wilson Act, which did just that – it
“allowed the states to preclude the sale of imported liquor.”187  During congres-
sional debates on the proposed law, members of Congress agreed that the Com-
merce Clause mandated uniformity; the only dispute was to what extent that
uniformity requirement was meant to reach.188  Opponents of the Wilson Act
argued that the proposed law would be unconstitutional for lack of uniform
rules, not uniform treatment, claiming
[t]he laws and regulations prescribed by the States would be as various as the charac-
teristics of their population and wholly wanting in uniformity.  The very object of
[the Commerce Clause] in the Constitution was to create uniformity . . . and yet [the
Wilson Act] would destroy all uniformity.  [The Wilson Act] would destroy the inter-
state-commerce clause of the Constitution and all the purposes for which it was
enacted originally.189
The concern was that allowing states to impose their own sets of rules would
create inefficiency in commerce and differing results in each state.190
180 Id.
181 See generally Colby, supra note 155.
182 Id. at 289.
183 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
184 Id. at 109.
185 Id. at 110.
186 Colby, supra note 155, at 293-94.
187 Id. at 294.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 294-95 (citing 21 CONG. REC. 5369 (1890) (statement of Rep. Culberson) and 21
CONG. REC. 4966, 4957 (1890) (statement of Sen. Vest) (internal quotations omitted).
190 See generally id. at 294-96.
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In contrast, proponents of the Wilson Act countered that Congress could
“allow for nonuniform results without running afoul of the uniformity con-
straint on the commerce power” as long as the states are treated alike.191  Sup-
porters of the law explained that the “effect of the bill . . . will be to leave every
State in the Union free to determine for itself what its policy shall be in respect
of the traffic in intoxicating liquors” which is constitutionally valid because it
gives “no preference to one State over another.”192  The prevailing view, then,
was that differing outcomes in the enforcement of federal law stemming from
the differences in varying state policies was permissible, as long as no state was
treated differently or its policies granted a preference by the federal legislation.
When the Wilson Act faced challenges in the courts, the previous argu-
ments of the legislative debates echoed once again.  Opponents, seeking strict
uniformity of rules, argued that the law “lack[ed] the element of uniformity,
which . . . is an indispensible requisite of the regulation of interstate com-
merce.”193  They claimed that the Framers intended that laws enacted by the
commerce power be “uniform in operation” resulting in “a uniform rule of reg-
ulation throughout the country.”194  Furthermore, if state laws were to differ on
the subject, then “there would always be that want of uniformity in regula-
tion . . . which we have seen is a requisite of any regulation of inter-state
commerce.”195
On the other hand, supporters of the Wilson Act defended its constitution-
ality by affirming its uniform treatment of the states.  They countered: “‘It is a
regulation of commerce, uniform and general in its operation’ in that it applies
equally to all of the states; ‘the want of uniformity,’ to the extent that there was
one, resulted from divergent state laws, which did not affect the constitutional-
ity of the federal statute.”196
The Court agreed with supporters of the Wilson Act and upheld the law.
In Wilkerson v. Rahrer,197 the Court’s decision confirmed what Leisy stood for:
that “a law allowing all of the states to regulate as they saw fit did not violate
the Commerce Clause.”198  Implying that the Commerce Clause mandated uni-
formity in treatment (or nondiscrimination between the states) the Court said,
“[Congress] has taken its own course and made its own regulation, applying to
these subjects of interstate commerce one common rule, whose uniformity is
not affected by variations in state laws. . .”199  In other words, says Professor
Colby, “in the relevant constitutional sense, the federal statute was uniform in
that it applied equally in every state (uniform treatment); it was only a differ-
191 Id. at 295.
192 See id. at 295 (citing CONG. REC. 4954 and 4965 (1890)) (emphasis added).
193 Colby, supra note 155, at 296 (citing Brief for the Appellee at 19, In re Rahrer, 140 U.S.
545 (1891) (No. 1529)) (emphasis omitted).
194 Id. at 296 (citing Brief for the Appellee at 40 and 22, In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891)
(No. 1529)).
195 Id. at 296 (citing Brief for the Appellee 25, In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891) (No.
1529)) (emphasis omitted).
196 Id. at 296-97 (citing Brief for the Appellant at 14, In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891)
(No. 1529))
197 In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
198 Colby, supra note 155, at 297.
199 In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added).
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ence in state laws that led to nonuniformity in the alcohol market (nonuniform
rules).  And that difference was not of a constitutional dimension.”200  Thus,
the issue appeared to be settled.
Unexpectedly however, while affirming this issue for a third time, the
Court’s poor choice of language “sowed the seeds of the evisceration” of the
Commerce Clause uniformity constraint in future cases.201  In the 1917 case
James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co.,202 the Court
considered the constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act, which was enacted
to address the ineffectiveness of the Wilson Act.203  The Webb-Kenyon Act
banned the shipment of alcohol into “dry states,” or states that prohibited (or
tightly restricted) the sale of alcohol.204  Opponents of the law raised the same
issues that were raised in Leisy and Rahrer; that is to say, the law “would
subvert the whole intent, spirit, and purpose of the commerce clause, which is
essentially to establish a uniform system.”205
The Court again rejected those arguments and sustained the law, just as it
had done in Leisy and Rahrer.  The Commerce Clause did not require uniform-
ity in the operating rules within states in order for federal law to remain true to
the Constitution – as long as the federal law treated states equally.  The Court
stated,
[S]o far as uniformity is concerned, there is no question that the act uniformly applies
to the conditions which call its provisions into play – that its provisions apply to all
the States, – so that the question really is a complaint as to the want of uniform
existence of things to which the act applies and not to an absence of uniformity in the
act itself.206
Thus, the Court had again reiterated that a federal law was valid when it
applied equally to the states, while not requiring uniform rules of ultimate
enforcement of the law in every state.  The Webb-Kenyon Act was still within
the constraint of constitutional uniformity even if some states chose to permit
the sale of alcohol within their borders (precluding enforcement of the law)
while other states did not (requiring enforcement of the law).
Unfortunately, the Court did not end its discussion of the issue there.  In
what Professor Colby calls “at best dysfunctionally inarticulate, at worst an ill-
considered and erroneous dictum,” the Court penned a statement that “alone
spawned the line of cases recounting the principle that there is no uniformity
requirement in the exercise of the commerce power.”207  Following its explana-
tion in support of uniform treatment, the Court stated: “But aside from this it is
obvious that the argument seeks to engraft upon the Constitution a restriction
not found in it, that is, that the power to regulate conferred upon Congress
obtains subject to the requirement that regulations enacted shall be uniform
200 Colby, supra note 155, at 297 (emphasis omitted).
201 Id. at 298.
202 James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
203 Id. at 320-21.
204 Colby, supra note 155, at 297.
205 Id. (quoting 49 CONG. REG. 2904 (1913)).
206 James Clark Distilling Co., 242 U.S. at 326-27 (emphasis added).
207 Colby, supra note 155, at 300.
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throughout the United States.”208  Professor Colby’s analysis of the issue sug-
gests the Court was referring to the argument by challengers of the law urging
uniform rules, not uniform treatment.  This is supported by the fact that the
Court subsequently examined Leisy again and concluded that it “plainly
refute[d]” the argument before the Court (rejecting uniform rules, but requiring
that interstate commerce “be governed by a uniform system”).209  Ultimately,
the Court simply meant to say that the statute in question was “uniform because
it treat[ed] all of the states the same.  Those who demand more – that a single,
uniform rule must ultimately apply to individuals in every state – are asking for
something that the Constitution does not require.”210
These ill-crafted and myopic comments resulted in a shift away from the
uniformity requirement once reverenced by the Court and inherent in the Com-
merce Clause.  Instead of promulgating the existence of the requirement, the
Court killed it off.  In Currin v. Wallace,211 some twenty years later, the Court
lost sight of the meaning of its previous decisions and, relying on James Clark
Distilling, wrongly rejected the notion of any kind of uniformity restraint on
the commerce power.  The Court opined, “To hold that Congress in establish-
ing its regulation is restricted to the making of uniform rules would be to
impose a limitation which the Constitution does not prescribe.  There is no
requirement of uniformity in connection with the commerce power.”212
This unfortunate error in constitutional law jurisprudence should be revis-
ited, because as was discussed earlier, the uniformity requirement of the com-
merce power was “perhaps [the Framers’] single most fundamental concern at
the [Constitutional] Convention.”213  The uniformity constraint was so impor-
tant to the Framers that it is doubtful whether the Constitution would have been
adopted without it.214  Stripping the uniformity requirement from the com-
merce power, especially as understood by the Framers, creates the potential for
fundamental unfairness and discrimination towards the states.  This is precisely
the problem with PASPA.
Other commentators agree that there is no logical reason for PASPA to
discriminate against most states by carving out exceptions that create a “federal
monopoly on lawful sports wagering” for a select few.215  As one PASPA
opponent, Senator Charles Grassley, posited, “There is simply no basis, as a
matter of Federal policy, for allowing sports wagering in three States while
prohibiting it in forty-seven, nor any rational basis, or support for the language
of [PASPA].”216
208 James Clark Distilling Co., 242 U.S. at 327.
209 Colby, supra note 155, at 299.
210 Id. at 300.
211 Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
212 Id. at 14.
213 Colby, supra note 155, at 313.
214 Id. at 311.
215 Michael Levinson, A Sure Bet: Why New Jersey Would Benefit from Legalized Sports
Wagering, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 143, 174 (2006) (citing S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 11 (1992),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3562).
216 S. REP NO. 102-248, at 11 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3563 (Minority
Views of Senator Grassley).
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A careful look at the scope of the Commerce Clause suggests PASPA is
unconstitutional.  Although the nature of the regulation promulgated by PASPA
may be duly authorized by the enumerated commerce power of Article I, it
must be applied uniformly to the several states.  PASPA, by providing an
exemption that allows four states to offer sports betting, but denying the same
prerogative to the other forty-six, contradicts the uniformity requirement of the
Commerce Clause.  With the PASPA question looming, the Court will soon
have an opportunity to recast the current Commerce Clause test to include once
again the lost uniformity constraint so critical to the Framers.
Embracing Justice Story’s admonition that the Commerce Clause was not
to be used to “regulate commerce[ ] injuriously to the interests of any one state,
so as to favour or aid another,”217 the appropriate test for the constitutionality
of Commerce Clause legislation should be Lopez, set upon the bedrock of fun-
damental fairness afforded to the states via uniform treatment.  In other words,
a federal law is valid when it regulates the channels of interstate commerce,
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or economic activities that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, so long as the law treats states uni-
formly, meaning no state is granted an unfair preference.  Only then will it
pass constitutional muster.
The weak attempts by PASPA challengers to argue the uniformity require-
ment thus far will not be sufficient to win over the Court.  Challengers’ argu-
ments must articulate the evolution of the error leading to the elimination of the
requirement, which is supported both by historical accounts of the Framing as
well as case law – especially when read in context.  Even so, there is no guar-
antee the Court will take on the issue.  Then again, there is effectively no
chance for the restoration of this lost requirement by the Court if challengers
fail to present evidence sufficient to make the arguments persuasively.
If the Court can be persuaded to revisit the evolution of the uniformity
requirement, it may be possible to persuade it to recast the Lopez test to include
the uniformity constraint, under which PASPA almost certainly would be ren-
dered unconstitutional as a blatant violation of uniform treatment of the states.
However, even if the Court does not agree with the above analysis, and chooses
not to revisit the uniformity constraint on the commerce power, PASPA may
still fall as a Tenth Amendment violation of states’ rights.
B. The Tenth Amendment Challenge
1. Traditional State Authority and the Value of Federalism
Just as the Court’s action with regard to the Commerce Clause question is
uncertain, it is also unclear whether the Court will accept a Tenth Amendment
challenge.  The overall weight of precedent over the last century seems to favor
the rejection of a federalism challenge.  However, the Court’s relatively recent
shift in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence at the close of the twentieth century
may have turned the tide.  Thus, the way in which challengers frame the Tenth
Amendment problem may provide an opportunity to carry the Court.
217 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1011
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Co. 1833).
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Opponents of PASPA must convince the Court that a law of this type
undermines the critical nature of federalism.  More specifically, PASPA threat-
ens the opportunity for states to contribute to the development of policies and
values that define the nation.  Furthermore, it simply encroaches too far into the
zone of authority traditionally reserved to state governments.
States, with distinct community values, are necessary to further principles
of federalism.  In discussing the values of dualism, one commentator noted that
a key argument in support of federalism is that “dualist models of federalism
generally correspond to an understanding of states as distinctive communities
of value.”218  The values espoused by the citizenry of the different states con-
tribute to justify the boundaries separating federal and state authority; further-
more, values may differ immensely between states.  This “diversity of views”
between the states “requires a broad policy market” that is a catalyst whereby
“distinctive republican communities [ ] realize the outcomes of their delibera-
tions.”219  Moreover, the divergence of competing values between the states
“also helps to suggest proper lines between national and state authority.  With
regard to the issues on which the states differ, states should enjoy autonomy.
On matters of overlapping beliefs, federal control may be appropriate.”220
This premise was touched upon in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in
Lopez.  While observing that it was doubtful any state would argue that prohib-
iting students from carrying guns on school grounds was unwise policy, he
recognized that “considerable disagreement exist[ed] about how best to accom-
plish” the goal of keeping guns out of schools.221  Moreover, Kennedy declared
that such a circumstance underscores the value of “the theory and utility of our
federalism,” whereby “the States may perform their role as laboratories for
experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from
clear.”222  Kennedy’s concerns were not novel, but merely reflected the out-
growth of the seed Justice Brandeis planted sixty years earlier, before the Com-
merce Clause’s historic expansion of power, and later echoed by Justices
Powell and O’Connor.  Justice Brandeis explained:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment might be fraught with serious consequences to the
Nation.  It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.223
Justice Powell agreed and questioned “how leaving the States virtually at
the mercy of the Federal Government, without recourse to judicial review, will
enhance their opportunities to experiment and serve as laboratories.”224  And
Justice O’Connor rounded out the idea by reiterating that “[c]ourts and com-
218 Shapiro, supra note 88, at 140.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
222 Id.
223 New State Ice Co., v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
224 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567-68 n.13 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
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mentators frequently have recognized that the 50 States serve as laboratories
for the development of new social, economic, and political ideas.”225
Consistent with this rationale is the fact that states view sports betting with
differing degrees of acceptance – from completely embracing all forms of
sports betting, to limiting the practice to lotteries, to outright rejection of sports
betting and gambling in all forms.226  Why not, then, preserve to states the
autonomy to regulate and control the extent and nature of gambling within their
borders?  Just as the proponents of the Wilson Act explained 120 years ago
with regard to the internal state policies for regulating intoxicating liquor, each
state should be permitted today to be “free to determine for itself what its policy
shall be” with regard to the internal regulations of sports betting.227  This is an
area in which the federal government should not interfere.228
2. PASPA as Morals Legislation
PASPA proponents successfully skirted the legality of the states’ rights
issue by casting PASPA as morals legislation.  As discussed previously, morals
legislation is one area in which the Court has been known to defer to the legis-
lature, even when constitutional authority was suspect.  Where the Court might
in other instances be inclined to invalidate a law for encroaching on states’
rights, it has been less likely to do so in areas of morals legislation.  Indeed, the
core policies behind PASPA are morals-based.229  Senator Bradley called
PASPA an “attempt to stem the growth of teenage gambling and protect the
integrity of sports.”230  He reasoned that the “revenue earned by states through
sports gambling [was] not enough to justify the waste and destruction attendant
to the practice.”231  Bradley summarized the opposition’s arguments as encom-
passing the two primary contentions discussed here – the Tenth Amendment
states’ rights issue and the Commerce Clause uniformity issue.232  Yet, while
acknowledging the arguments, Bradley confidently assured PASPA supporters
that both contentions could be rejected as “foreclosed” by federal case law.233
Relying on Champion v. Ames,234 as the “closest the Court has come” to
addressing the constitutionality of laws like PASPA, Bradley postulated that
the Court’s discussion of Congress’s ability to legislate “an evil. . .carried on
225 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 7888 (1982) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting).
226 See Types of Gaming by State, http://www.americangaming.org/industry-resources/
research/fact-sheets/states-gaming (last visited Aug. 17, 2011).
227 Colby, supra note 155, at 295 (citing 21 CONG. REC. 4954 (1890) (statement of Sen.
Wilson) (emphasis added)).
228 Congress clearly advanced this premise in other areas of gambling, including the Inter-
state Horse Racing Act of 1978. 15 U.S.C. § 3001(a) (2006) (“The Congress finds that (1)
the States should have the primary responsibility for determining what forms of gambling
may legally take place within their borders.”) (emphasis added).
229 See Bradley, supra note 160, at 7.
230 Id. at 5.
231 Id. at 6.
232 Id. at 11.
233 Id. at 12.
234 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
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through interstate commerce,” was definitive on the issue.235  Bradley con-
tended that here, as in the lottery regulation of Champion, Congress may regu-
late sports betting as a “moral and social wrong” affecting interstate
commerce.236
To bolster that proposition, PASPA proponents claimed that Perez v.
United States237 left no doubt about Congress’s ability to regulate activities
considered immoral.238  In Perez, the Court considered the constitutionality of
a portion of the Consumer Credit Protection Act that prohibited the use of
extortionate means to collect extensions of credit; in other words, the law pro-
hibited “loan sharking.”  The Court held that the Commerce Clause extended to
“those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce,”239 and because
congressional findings were “quite adequate” in indicating that loan sharking
was closely tied to interstate organized crime, loan sharking, although a purely
intrastate activity, could be legislated with the commerce power.240
Bradley explained that Congress relied on findings by the Subcommittee
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks indicating sports betting negatively
impacted “compulsive gambling among teenagers” and that the problem was
becoming an epidemic across the nation.241  This, he claimed, justified the use
of the commerce power to regulate sports betting, just as congressional findings
of interstate ties to organized crime justified legislating loan sharking in
Perez.242
Finally, PASPA proponents relied on cases like United States v.
Smaldone,243 which upheld the constitutionality of a federal gambling statute
using the reasoning in Perez.244  Smaldone and other codefendants were con-
victed under the statute for participating in illegal bookmaking of sporting
events.  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the statute represented a
“valid and constitutional exercise of power under the Commerce Clause,” and
the argument that the statute exceeded interstate commerce power was “fore-
closed” by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Perez.245  The Tenth Circuit likened
the loan sharking statute in Perez to the illegal bookmarking statute in
Smaldone, noting that the legislative history behind the illegal bookmaking
statute was “replete” with examples of congressional findings “concerning the
detrimental impact that illegal gambling has on interstate commerce,” including
a report that “gambling is the greatest source of revenue for organized
crime.”246
235 Bradley, supra note 160, at 12-13 (citing Champion v. Ames, 118 U.S. 321, 357-58
(1903)).
236 Id. at 14.
237 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
238 Bradley, supra note 160, at 14.
239 Perez, 402 U.S. at 151.
240 Id. at 155.
241 Bradley, supra note 160, at 15.
242 Id. at 14-15.
243 United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1973).
244 Id. at 1343.
245 Id. at 1342.
246 Id. at 1342-43.
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But does a congressional finding that sports betting negatively impacts
“compulsive gambling among teenagers” really justify use of the commerce
power to ban sports wagering in some states but not others?  Arguably, no.
How would the Court react if Congress banned beer sales, based on a finding
that doing so would curb national underage drinking rates, in all states except
the state with the highest consumption rate, California,247 simply because it did
not want to disrupt California’s sizeable tax revenue from beer sales?  Or how
would the Court react if, based on a finding that suggested an almost guaran-
teed reduction in cancer-related deaths from smoking, Congress banned the sale
of tobacco in all states, except the two states with the highest smoking rates,
Kentucky and West Virginia,248 because smoking was already so established
there that Congress did not desire to disrupt the tax base those states had come
to rely on?  Although the hypothetical findings in both scenarios seem reasona-
ble (and may in fact be true), it seems absurd to suggest that Congress would
ever be able to enact such laws constitutionally.
Yet, both scenarios are similar to the PASPA problem, as both would
arguably represent an attempt to regulate a “moral and social wrong” or “an
evil. . .carried on through interstate commerce,”249 seemingly justifiable by leg-
islative findings.  Notwithstanding the similarities, the Court would most likely
strike those laws as invalid exercises of the Commerce Clause power, both for
not being uniform in their treatment of the states and for infringing upon the
rights of states to regulate the health, safety, welfare, and morals of their citi-
zens, which is inherent in the police power reserved to them by the Constitu-
tion.  Remember, eight years after PASPA was enacted, the Court in Morrison
stated that congressional findings alone are not sufficient to warrant federal
commerce power legislation that encroaches on states’ rights.250
While the Court appears to defer to Congress in the area of national
morals regulation in cases like Champion, Perez, and Smaldone, that is not
necessarily the case for all morals regulation. Champion, Perez, Smaldone,
and the other case law relied upon by PASPA sponsors, may not “foreclose”
the issue of PASPA’s constitutionality at all.  The Champion Court, while
including morals-based policy rationales and rhetoric in its decision, more
accurately based its holding on the nature of the commerce itself, rather than
the morality of the subject matter being regulated.  The law regulating lotteries
under the commerce power was upheld because it regulated the trafficking of
lottery tickets through interstate commerce, not because lotteries themselves
were viewed as immoral.
247 Beer Institute, Shipment of Malt Beverages and Per Capita Consumption by State 2009,
(June 18, 2010), available at http://beerinstitute.org/BeerInstitute/files/ccLibraryFiles/File
name/000000001059/State%20data%20per%20capita%20consumption%202003%20to%20
2009.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2011) (showing 22,958,866 units of 31-gallon barrels shipped
to California).
248 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, State-Specific Prevalence of Cigarette
Smoking and Smokeless Tobacco Use Among Adults – United States, 2009, MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY, REP., Nov. 5, 2010 1393, at 1400, available at http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/pdf/wk/mm5943.pdf (Kentucky and Virginia have the highest current smoking preva-
lence rate at 25.6%).
249 See supra Part III.B.2.
250 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000).
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3. Regulating Commerce versus Regulating Sovereigns
PASPA proponents’ reliance on Perez and Smaldone is faulty for yet
another reason.  As discussed above, the legislative findings in those cases were
not enough, alone, to support the exercise of the commerce power.  In fact, the
Perez Court required a connection, or substantial relationship, to interstate
commerce as well.251  While legislative findings might be useful for framing
the policy issues behind PASPA, its proponents’ reliance on Perez and
Smaldone to support the use of legislative findings to justify PASPA by anal-
ogy is simply inadequate.  Moreover, whether based on a morals justification or
not, the laws at issue in Champion, Perez, and Smaldone only restricted actions
of citizens in interstate commerce.  They did not impede the sovereign capacity
of state governments to continue to regulate the actions of those citizens – a
key distinguishing characteristic of PASPA.
The Court made clear in New York v. United States that the proper scope
of the Commerce Clause is that it only extends to the regulation of citizens252
of the states and to states as participants in commerce,253 but not to states as
sovereigns.  More particularly, the Court explained that even when the Consti-
tution authorizes Congress to compel or prohibit certain acts, Congress may not
directly compel the states to do the same.254  “The allocation of power con-
tained in the Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate
interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state
governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”255  For instance, whereas
Congress’s mandate that states perform background checks under a federal gun
control law was prohibited by the Constitution,256 its restriction on the ability
of states to disclose personal information about drivers obtained from driver
license applications was upheld.257  The former federal law was invalidated for
allowing Congress to commandeer the sovereignty of state government in order
to implement a federal mandate.  In contrast, the latter law was sustained
because it merely regulated states as market participants engaged in the sale
and release of personal information, which the Court deemed to be an article in
the interstate stream of commerce.258
By this analysis, PASPA is and should be declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.  While the Commerce Clause would deem it proper for Con-
gress to regulate sports betting in interstate commerce, PASPA oversteps its
bounds when it infringes upon states’ rights to authorize and regulate sports
betting carried out and performed wholly within their borders.  The extent to
which PASPA could be valid must be limited to the federal regulation of inter-
state trafficking of sports betting between citizens of different states.  It must
not infringe upon the sovereignty of the states themselves.
251 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156-57 (1971).
252 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
253 See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
254 New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
255 Id. (emphasis added).
256 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997).
257 Condon, 528 U.S. at 148.
258 Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A review of Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence sug-
gests that PASPA is unconstitutional.  While it is certainly based in the realm
of enumerated constitutional authority, PASPA goes beyond the scope intended
by the Framers.  If PASPA challengers can persuade the Court to revisit the
genesis of the uniformity requirement, and its subsequent misplaced evolution,
then the Court may find a reason to restate the Lopez test so that it includes the
uniformity-in-treatment constraint.259  If successful, PASPA almost certainly
would be rendered unconstitutional as a blatant violation of uniform treatment
of the states.
Still, the most likely challenge to prevail, given the current legal environ-
ment, is the Tenth Amendment challenge.  PASPA oversteps its bounds and
infringes upon the rights reserved to the states to authorize and regulate sports
betting within their borders.  PASPA would be a valid exercise of authority if it
simply regulated the interstate trafficking of sports betting between citizens of
different states, but because it infringes upon the sovereignty of the states them-
selves, it should not prevail.
Unfortunately, despite the soundness, validity, and appeal of the above
arguments, this writer believes it may be difficult to carry the Court.  The enor-
mous expansion of Commerce Clause power, stare decisis, and an emergent,
yet not fully developed, Tenth Amendment check on the commerce power,
make immediate relief likely to be elusive in spite of the merits.
In the end, even if the Court rejects each of the challenges discussed
above, opponents are not without options.  They can still take solace in the fact
that it may be possible to overturn PASPA using the good old-fashioned politi-
cal process.  PASPA was justified largely on the idea that sports betting was an
evil to be suppressed, but perhaps a shifting public sentiment and a distilling of
the arguments over the years by commentators have created an environment
ripe for legislative repeal.260
259 Although in the majority in Lopez, Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence as well urging
the Court to reformulate its Commerce Clause test into a narrower one: “I write separately to
observe that our case law has drifted far from the original understanding of the Commerce
Clause.  In a future case, we ought to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a man-
ner that both makes sense of our more recent case law and is more faithful to the original
understanding of that Clause.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
260 Fewer people may be viewing gambling as a “moral and social wrong.”  In fact, fifty
percent of the population now approves of casino gambling. See 50% Favor Casino Gam-
bling In Their State, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.rasmussenreports.
com/public_content/lifestyle/general_lifestyle/august_2010/50_favor_casino_gambling_in_
their_state.
